Defence Infrastructure Organisation

Gas Safety Management Plan (Section B)

Poole ARC ACF

07/04/2025

Produced to meet the requirements of the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996

(Gas Safety Management Plan (Section A) covers the requirements of the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations 1998

(Gas Safety Management Plan (Section B) covers the requirements of the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996

ESTABLISHMENT KEY PERSONALITIES (GAS) CONTACTS

Role	Name	Tel No.	Email
Head of Establishment	Lt Col Oliver Bevan	07802 881277	oliver.bevan144@mod.gov.uk
Establishment's SHEF	Steve Barnes	07946 720697	steve.barnes163@mod.gov.uk
Establishments 4C's Coordinator	Jon Nichols	07401379307	jonathan.nichols103@mod.gov.uk
Senior DIO Estate Representative or Equivalent	Mark Cubitt	01823 217949	wx-est-hd@rfca.mod.uk
Site DIO Estate Representative or Equivalent	Kelvin Walker	01823 217942 07508 130359	wx-est-mgr2@rfca.mod.uk
MMO Site Manager or equivalent	Paul Wakeford	07356 101565	paul.wakeford@vivodefence.com
Gas Safety Manager (GSM)	Justin Westcott	07793 220820	justin.westcott@vivodefence.com
Gas Responsible Person (GRP)	Ian Jackson	07887 760568	Ian.jackson2@vivodefence.com

The Content of this Gas Safety Management Plan (GSMP) have been Approved by the Gas Safety Manager:

Signature: JP Westcott	**Date: 07/04/2025**

Authorisation for Implementation

The content and format of this GSMP has been agreed and authorised for implementation by Defence Infrastructure Organisation Technical Services Principal Gas Engineer (DIO TS PGE) and a unique reference number has been generated to support this.

Approved – J Obbard PGE – 27th Oct 2022

The Content of this GSMP have been agreed by the Senior DIO Estate Representative or Equivalent and future works following the findings will be supported:

Signature: M Cubitt	**Date: 28/04/2025**

The content of this GSMP have been agreed by the Head of Establishment and future works following the findings will be supported

Signature: O.Bevan	**Date: 04/06/25**

Reviews and Amendments

GSMPs are 'living documents' that should be subject to continual review and updating as required. Although the level of attention required will vary considerably depending on the size and complexity of each site, GSMPs should be reviewed at least once per quarter by the GRP. Although it is likely that changes are not required at each review, the date of review and any changes made should be indicated on the tables below. The review of the GSMP will include a site visit to ensure that the site and the content of the GSMP remain valid. The reviews and amendments made will be deleted during the DIO TS three yearly review when the GSMP is re-authorised by the PGE.

Date	Page No.	Amendment
21/03/2022	All	Initial Development
19/07/2022	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
19/10/2022	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
19/01/2023	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
27/04/2023	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
27/07/2023	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
27/10/2023	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
05/02/2024	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
26/03/2024	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
27/07/2024	*N/A*	No amendment or update required
18/10/2024		GSM re-authorisation (previously authorised 27/04/2022)
22/10/2024	ii	Updated Head of Establishment, Head of Estates and site DIO Representative details
22/10/2024	1 (1.3)	Updated Head of Establishment details
22/10/2024	2 (1.3)	Updated Senior DIO representative
22/10/2024	*6 (2.5)*	Updated MoD Network description.
24/01/2025	N/A	No amendment or update required
21/02/2025	ii	Update details of key personnel (GSM & RP)
21/02/2025	2. (1.4)	Change MMO details / personnel (Vivo – GSM & RP)
21/02/2025	3. (1,5)	Changes to emergency number
04/04/2025	ii	Update contact list

Date	Reviewed by	Authorised by	Comments
24/04/2022	D. Cooper	N King	Initial review
19/07/2022	D. Cooper		Q1 review
19/10/2022	D. Cooper		Q2 review
19/01/2023	D. Cooper		Q3 review
27/04/2023	D. Cooper		Annual review site visit
27/07/2023	D. Cooper		Q1 review
27/10/2023	D. Cooper		Q2 review
05/02/2024	D. Cooper		Q3 review
26/03/2024	D. Cooper		Site visit
27/07/2024	D. Cooper		Review
18/10/2024	Neville King	Neville King	GSM re-authorisation
22/10/2024	D. Cooper		Site visit
24/01/2025	D. Cooper		DNV demobilisation review / site audit
21/02/2025	Ian Jackson		3 monthly review following change to Vivo Defence
07/04/2025	J Westcott	J Westcott	Initial review Approval – Noting Emergency exercise to be planned and review of network status/classification.

FORWARD

MOD, as a gas conveyor within Great Britain, has submitted an Exemplar Gas Safety Case (MOD GSC) to demonstrate compliance with the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996 (GSMR). Maintenance Management Organisations (MMO's) are engaged who have the overall contractual responsibility to operate and maintain the gas network assets under their Contract, including the management of the safe flow of gas within the system and the provision of an emergency service. The MOD delegate specific duties to the MMO but accountability for gas safety on each site rests with the Head of Establishment.

The MOD GSC considers all parts of the MOD estates gas supply system that forms part of the gas supply network. This includes all parts of the MOD estates network from the External Gas Distribution Network (EGDN) connection point to the emergency control valve (ECV) of individual consumers. The MOD GSC considers primarily those matters that relate to the management of the safe flow of gas within the system and the provision of an emergency service.

The conclusions of the assessments within the MOD GSC are:

- There is an adequate safety management system in place to manage the flow of gas safely in its gas supply system.
- Adequate arrangements are in place to comply with the requirements of GSMR and allow co-operation with other bodies that have duties under the regulations.
- Adequate arrangements are in place for ensuring that gas conveyed within the system meets the standards for composition and pressure.
- Adequate arrangements are in place for dealing with reports of gas escapes and investigation of incidents.
- Adequate arrangements have been made to ensure that the risk of a supply failure is minimised.
- Adequate arrangements have been made to ensure that supply emergencies are managed safely.

The MOD GSC is a generic document that outlines the gas safety systems and processes in place for gas networks within the MOD estate. Site-specific details and arrangements are contained within this establishment Gas Safety Management Plan (Section B) (GSMP). As a site-specific component of the MOD GSC, this GSMP has the same legal standing under GSMR.

The layout and structure of this GSMP mirrors that of its parent GSC

Following initial approval by the DIO PGE, the GSM is required to reapprove this GSMP annually. GSMP must be submitted to DIO TS every three years for PGE authorisation.

The HoE and Senior DIO Estate Representative or Equivalent would only be required to re-sign this GSMP annually following the GSM reapproval, unless significant changes to the gas system or a change in one of these key personalities occurs.

GSMP Section A documents detail MOD measures to ensure compliance with the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations 1998 (GSIUR) for installation pipework (downstream of Emergency Control Valves).

Although the legal status of this document applies in the UK only, the MOD apply the same requirements to the management of natural gas networks on its overseas estate in accordance with the currently published Secretary of State's Health and Safety policy statement.

Contents

1 THE DUTY HOLDER AND ESTABLISHMENT LEVEL KEY PERSONALITIES

1.1. Gas Safety Case Duty Holder.	
The duty holder for the MOD Gas Safety Case is the Permanent Under Secretary for Defence (PUS). However, day to day responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of the document is delegated to the DIO TS Head of Engineering and Construction, who also has the responsibility for managing the system in accordance with the Safety Case. PUS delegates maintenance responsibility to the Top-Level Budget Holders (TLB's), to manage safety of the gas network. The TLB's utilise MOD Contracts i.e. MMOs who have responsibility for maintaining the gas network on behalf of the MOD.	
Name: Address:	Permanent Under Secretary Main Building Horse Guards Parade Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

1.2. DIO Technical Services Principal Gas Engineer (PGE).	
The PGE assumes the role of Senior Authorising Authority which is a term used within the MOD to recognise the authority of the person responsible for overseeing the appointment of, and auditing Authorising Engineers (AEs). For Gas the AEs are replaced by Gas Safety Managers (GSMs).	
Name: Address: ☎: ✉:	Jeremy Obbard DIO HQ Whittington Barracks Lichfield WS14 9TJ 07748 903260 Jeremy.obbard100@mod.gov.uk

1.3. Establishment Personalities.		
Name of Establishment:	Poole ARC ACF	
Establishment Address:	Wallisdown Road Wallisdown, Poole, BH12 5AD	
Head of Establishment (HoE) (This is the most senior MOD person identified, by the chain of command, as responsible for the establishment. The HoE holds accountability for ensuring site compliance with the requirements of GSMR and the MOD GSC, including this GSMP.)	Name: Position: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Lt Col Oliver Bevan CO British Army, MOD BN HQ 6 RIFLES Block 7 Wyvern Bks Exeter Devon EX2 6AR 07802 881277 oliver.bevan144@mod.gov.uk

Establishment 4C's	Name: Position: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Mr Jon Nichols Caretaker MOD Wallisdown Road, Wallisdown, Poole, BH12 5AD 07401 379307 jonathan.nichols103@mod.gov.uk
Establishment SHEF	Name: Position: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Steve Barnes AFPA MoD Block 7, Wyvern Bks, Exeter, Devon, EX2 6AR 07946720697 steve.barnes163@mod.gov.uk
Senior DIO representative or equivalent (This may be the SEFM, but will vary depending on the contract this establishment falls under)	Name: Position: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Mark Cubitt Head of Estates DIO Mount House Mount Street Taunton Somerset TA1 3QE 01823 217949 wx-est-hd@rfca.mod.uk
Site Guardroom (24 Hours)	☎:	No Guardroom on this site.
Site emergency services (Are they 24 Hours?)	Fire ☎: Police ☎: Medical ☎:	No site emergency services on this site.

1.4. Maintenance Management Organisation (MMO).		
The MMO for this establishment is:		**VIVO**
MMO Helpdesk- Gas Emergencies only (24 Hours) Note: Please do not contact the general public National Gas Emergency Service for suspected escapes on RFCA infrastructure	Organisation: ☎:	VIVO Helpdesk Helpdesk 25 Goodlass Road Hunts Cross Liverpool L24 9HJ 0800 030 9320
MMO Helpdesk (24 Hours)	Organisation: Address: ☎:	VIVO Helpdesk Helpdesk 25 Goodlass Road Hunts Cross Liverpool L24 9HJ 0800 030 9320
Site Contact	Name: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Jon Nichols MoD Wallisdown Road, Wallisdown, Poole, BH12 5AD 07401 379307 jonathan.nichols103@mod.gov.uk
Gas Safety Manager (GSM)	Name: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	**Justin Westcott** VIVO BLD 003 CTCRM Lympstone Nr Exmouth Devon EX8 5AR 07793 222820 Justin.Westcott@vivodefence.com
Gas Responsible Person (GRP)	Name: Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	**Ian Jackson** VIVO BLD 311 – Estates Office Cracknore Hard Lane Southampton SO40 4ZG 07887 760568 Ian.Jackson2@vivodefence.com

1.5. Additional Gas Contacts.		
Meter Asset Manager (MAM)	Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Energy Assets Ltd 6 Almondvale Business Park, Almondvale Way, Livingston EH54 6GA 0150 6405405 ralphreekie@EnergyAssets.co.uk
Gas Supplier	Organisation: Address: ☎: ✉:	Total Energies Gas & Power 55-57 High Street Redhill Surrey RH1 1RX 01737 275 746 gp.redhill.ccs@totalenergies.com
DIO SD EUS (Service, Delivery, Energy, Utility and Sustainability)	☎: ✉:	01213 113854 DIOSDEUS-enaccounts@mod.gov.uk
National Gas Emergency Centre (24 Hours)	☎:	0800 111 999
National Emergency Services (24 Hours)	Fire ☎: Police ☎: Medical ☎:	999 999 999

2 OPERATION UNDERTAKEN

2.1 Site Overview.

A brief description of the establishment and its current use. This should include how many separate sites are present, number of buildings being supplied by gas, what the gas is used for and number of personnel who will be affected by a gas outage. Any critical loads should be initial highlighted here (quick reaction forces, large medical facilities, temp controlled ammunition stores etc)

Poole ARC ACF has two buildings on site supplied with gas. One being the Poole ARC ACF building, and the other is the caretaker's house. With gas being supplied direct from the EGDN network at low pressure and each building has its own MAM owned and operated gas meter and regulator. The gas is used for heating, hot water and cooking with no critical load.

The Reserve Centre was opened in August 1953 and is now used by 6 Rifles C company. This site is manned during the day and offered to outside agencies as a conference and training facility.

The main building has a drill hall / conference hall, kitchen, bar, offices/classroom, storage, gym and shower facilities.

2.2 Document Centre.

Location of the establishment Gas Document Centre containing all information relating to the gas systems at this establishment (Ref: MOD GSC 10.2) and contact details if different to the GRP.

The Gas document centre is held electronically by VIVO on the SharePoint system.
It is intended eventually to have a system accessible to the RFCA.

2.3 Purpose of Pipeline(s).

A brief description of demarcation agreements between the EGDN, MAM and MOD. Number of MOD networks including operating pressures and number of buildings being supplied direct from the EGDN. End users of gas being supplied such as accommodation, workshops, catering facilities etc.

The gas supplied to Poole ARC ACF is fed from a SGN single feed low pressure network which supplies the site bulk fiscal meter. This feeds the MoD Low pressure network on site at 21.4 mbar which then supplies gas to one building. The gas is used for catering, heating and hot water.

The MoD is responsible from the meter outlet valve of the primary meter up to and including the appliance in the plantroom, laundry and kitchen.

There is one individual EDGN supplied Caretakers House with its own MAM owned and operated gas meter and regulator which supplies gas to a boiler and hob.

2.4 Consumers.

Consumers can be broadly categorised as domestic or industrial / commercial. Gas supplies to domestic consumers are normally prioritised above industrial / commercial consumers.

Domestic consumers supplied from the MOD network:	0
Industrial / commercial consumers supplied from the MOD network:	1

2.5 Description of MOD Gas Networks.

A description of the MOD gas network(s) including location of primary meter(s), twin stream or single stream, primary meter kiosk construction and condition. Pipeline length, material, diameter, pressure, age and condition. Are any PRIs present and number of buildings being supplied?

The gas supply to Poole ARC ACF is supplied from the EGDN (SGN) low pressure network and enters the site at the West of the establishment into a GRP meter housing.

There is a 2” steel riser entering the GRP gas meter housing, and the gas runs through the EGDN ECV, and the MAM owned and operated regulator with a G25 (40m³/hr) single stream gas meter installation.

The MoD’s responsibility begins after the gas meter outlet valve (2”). The outlet gas pressure is 21.5mbar, so the MoD network is a low pressure (LP) network.

The MOD network leaves the Bulk Fiscal meter in 2” steel and drops below ground. There appears to be one section that is thought to be 2” and 90mm PE section.

Adjacent to the main building, at the end of the rifle range building, there is a SIV located in the tarmac walkway and a 2” ECV housed in a GRP enclosure. From this GRP enclosure, 63mm PE installation pipework extends all the way to the main building plantroom, which is equipped with an internal AECV.

The building does not have individual PRI’s.

The MoD Network is 33m.

2.6 Primary Meter Details.

The following table describes the basic arrangement of the incoming primary meter installation(s). (These are the responsibility of the MAM)

Number of primary meter installations:	1

Meter Name / ID	MAM Responsible	Inlet pipeline (responsibility of the EGDN)				Outlet pipeline (responsibility of the MOD)				Max Flow (M^3 hr)
		P tier – HP, IP, MP, LP	Pressure (mbar)	Material (EGDN Network)	Diameter (mm)	P tier – HP, IP, MP, LP	Pressure (mbar)	Material (MOD Network)	Diameter (mm)	
G25 – K02607 14 D6	Energy Assets Ltd	LP	24.3	PE/steel	50	LP	21.5	Steel	50	40

2.7 Utilisation Meters (meters supplied directly from the MOD gas network)

Utilisation Meter Details can be seen in the GSMP section A.

Number of utilisation meter installations:	0

2.8 Secondary Pressure Regulating Installations (PRIs).

The following table describes the basic arrangement of the PRIs. (This does not include utilisation meter governors installed downstream of the consumers ECV)

Number of PRI installations:	None

PRI Name / ID	Nominal Reg size (mm)	Inlet pipeline				Outlet pipeline				Kiosk construction / condition
		P tier – MP, LP	Pressure (mbar)	Material (MOD Network)	Diameter (mm)	P tier – MP, LP	Pressure (mbar)	Material (MOD Network)	Diameter (mm)	

2.9 Emergency Control Valves (ECVs).

The ECV(s) are included in the scope of the network and are therefore the responsibility of the MOD.

The MOD gas networks at this establishment terminates at:	1 ECV

Building Name / Number	Incoming Gas Pressure	Appliance / Process / Domestic	ECV No. / Code	Indoors / Outdoors	Key required to access the ECV – Where from?	ECV Location	Handle Fitted	ECV correctly labelled	Nominal Valve Size
Main Building	21.4	Heating	No tag	Indoors	Yes, in external brake glass box.	Rifle range	Yes	Yes	50 mm

2.10 MOD Network Pipeline Details.

The table below shows the total pipeline lengths for the different pipe diameters and operating pressures.

Network Name / ID	Pressure (mbar)	Pipe Material	Pipe Diameter (mm)	Number of Sections	Total Length (m)
Network 001	No test point	Steel	50	1	2
Network 001	No test point	PE	90	1	31
Total length of all MOD networks:					33

2.11 Network Interconnection.

The outlet pipework system from each of the primary meter installations can be isolated networks or may be interconnected with other MOD systems. For isolated systems turning off the gas supply at a single primary meter installation will shut off supply to all buildings / processes on that pipe system. Interconnected systems will require two or more primary meter installations to be turned off. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below show the differences.

The MOD pipework system on this establishment are:		Isolated
Supply from Primary Meter (Name / ID)	Pressure (mbar)	Can the interconnection be isolated?
None	N/A	N/A



Figure 2.1 – Isolated MOD pipework systems



Figure 2.2 – Interconnected MOD pipework systems

2.12 Sensitive and Critical Loads.

The MOD does not have any 'interruptible consumers. Historically large industrial / commercial consumers, who had an alternative fuel supply, could opt to pay a lower rate for an interruptible contract which enabled the supplier to isolate their supply at short notice in order to preserve the gas supply to the public and 'firm contract' industrial consumers in the event of a supply shortage.

However, all industrial and commercial supplies are, effectively, 'interruptible' isolation of these will usually be requested by the supplier in times of supply emergencies in order to preserve domestic supplies for as long as possible.

Where Industrial / commercial consumers have particularly sensitive or critical end users these can be taken into consideration by the EGDN when requesting isolation. Sensitive consumers could include supplies such as a school, medical facility, temperature-controlled ammunition stores etc.

The number of sensitive loads at this establishment is:	None	
Facility / Consumers	Supplied from primary meter name / ID	Approx. max throughput (m^3 hr)
None	N/A	N/A

2.13 Standby Alternative fuel Supplies.

Where operational critical supplies are present on site a standby alternative fuel supply should be considered which would enable continued operation in the event of either a local or national supply emergency.

Facility / Consumers	Supplied from primary meter name / ID	Approx. max throughput (m^3 hr)	Alternative fuel supply
None	N/A	N/A	N/A

3 PLANT AND PREMISES

3.1 Drawings.

The gas layout drawings provide an overview of the gas network and the interfaces(s) with the EGDNs network.

The layout drawings should detail:

a) The site boundaries.
b) The primary meter installations.
c) Secondary PRIs.
d) Valve locations.
e) Pipeline routes, diameters, material and depth.
f) Operating pressure tier.
g) Demarcations
h) Responsibilities (EGDN / MOD)

The layout drawings are located at Annex B either embed as a PDF or hard copies. The drawings will be subject to the GRP quarterly review and following any physical changes or system updates. Hard copies of the drawings are located in the gas document centre.

Gas Layout Drawing Number	Revision Date	Scale	Detail
WX65-B-A1	8/8/22	1:250	WX65-B-A1.pdf Drawing to be updated due to network alterations.

3.2 Additional Drawings.

In addition to layout drawings the below additional drawings are available from the gas documents centre and GRP.

Additional Drawing Number	Revision Date	Scale	Detail
WX65-A-A3	14/9/22	NTS	WX65-A-A3.pdf Drawing to be updated due to installation alterations.

3.3 Responsibility Interfaces and Access Arrangements.

For gas incidents or maintenance that affect the EGDN, the EGDN representative will become the network emergency controller. The EGDN establishment direct contact will be the GRP who will make all relevant arrangements for access to the primary meter(s) and plant room access (for emergency isolation etc).

As the MOD establishments are high security, all EGDN personnel who attend for gas supply emergencies or to carry out maintenance work will be granted access to site on an individual basis.

All EGDN personnel attending this establishment will be subject to site specific security procedures and will be required to be escorted whilst on site, access and escorting may vary depending on the nature of the visit, time of incident etc.

Below are the site-specific arrangements in place to allow the EGDN access during an emergency, as agreed by the HOE:

Working hours and out of hours contact: Onsite Caretaker 07401 379307

4. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE DOCUMENTATION

4.1 MOD Network Maintenance.

Network maintenance is mandated in GSMR and all network maintenance requirements and tasks on MOD establishments are detailed in the MOD Gas Network Technical Standard TS/GAS-01. TS/GAS-01 has been written in line with legislation, industry standards and guidelines.

The testing, inspecting and maintenance frequencies vary depending on the task, the table below shows the intervals at which it should be conducted and the date the tasks have been complete.

TS/GAS-01 Job No.	Maximum Interval Period	Brief Description of Task	Task was completed on
1	**General**		
1.1	5 Years	Network Analysis – to model the adequacy of network design	30/08/22
1.2	5 Years	Network Validation Survey – to check network analysis model with measured data	Completed by DNV as part of the network survey for the site 22/02/22
2	**Iron Pipelines, mains and services (includes buried outlet pipework from Primary Meter Installations and PRIs.)** Note: iron pipes are not permitted for use with LPG – any such pipes must be immediately scheduled for replacement		
2.3	12 Month	FIM (or similar) leakage survey – Pipes within 30m of a building	N/A – no iron pipe
2.4	12 Month	Over line pipe survey – Pipes within 30m of a building	N/A – no iron pipe
2.5	5 Years	FIM (or similar) leakage survey – all pipe routes within site, regardless of proximity to buildings	N/A – no iron pipe
2.6	5 Years	Over line pipe survey – all pipe routes within site, regardless of proximity to buildings	N/A – no iron pipe
3	**Steel Pipelines, mains and services (includes buried outlet pipework from Primary Meter Installations and PRIs.)** Note: buried steel pipes are not permitted for use with LPG – any such pipes must be immediately scheduled for replacement, and the SME(Gas) informed		
3.1	12 Month	Cathodic Protection (CP) monitoring survey	N/A – no CP
3.2	12 Month	Leakage survey (where no CP installed) – pipes within 5m of buildings	Completed by DNV as part of the network survey for the site 22/02/22
3.3	5 Years	Leakage survey (where no CP installed) – regardless of proximity to buildings	Completed by DNV as

			part of the network survey for the site 22/02/22
3.4	5 Years	Over line pipe survey (where no CP installed) – regardless of proximity to buildings	Completed by DNV as part of the network survey for the site 22/02/22
3.5	10 Years	Close Interval Potential Survey (CIPS) – for buried pipelines, mains and services with CP installed	N/A
4	**Polyethylene (PE) Pipelines, mains and services**		
4.1	5 Years	Leakage survey – All pipes within site regardless of proximity to buildings	Completed by DNV as part of the network survey for the site 21/02/22
4.2	5 Years	Over line pipe survey – All pipes within site regardless of proximity to buildings	Completed by DNV as part of the network survey for the site 22/02/22
5	**This section refers to LPG installations only – refer to TS/GAS-01**		
6	**Secondary Pressure Regulating Installations (PRIs).** Note: this is for secondary network PRIs only – it does not include the PRIs associated with the Primary Meter Installation(s), first-stage LPG regulators or the Meter regulator(s) installed downstream of the consumers / user ECVs		
6.1	12 Month	Functional check of PRI including safety / redundant systems	N/A - no PRI
6.2	12 Month	Visual inspection of pipework within PRI housing	N/A - no PRI
7	**Meter and PRI Housings** Scope for this activity includes the housing of all meter and PRI installations		
7.1	12 Month	Inspection of PRI housing (where present)	N/A - no PRI
8	**Valves**		
8.1	12 Month	Inspection of valve chambers	No chambers
8.2	12 Month	Leakage detection survey within valve chamber	No chambers

4.2 Iron Pipework.

Where cast iron (including spun iron) or ductile iron pipework exists on an MOD establishment it is to be risk assessed in accordance with section 4.3 of the MOD GSC and, where required, entered into a mains replacement programme in order to comply with the UK mains replacement enforcement policy.

Below is the amount of Cast Iron and / or Ductile Iron pipe, and details, identified at this establishment from a survey:

Cast Iron (m):	Not Applicable
Ductile Iron (m):	0

Pressure (mbar)	Nominal Diameter (“)	Cast Iron or Ductile Iron	Total Length (m)	Closet Proximity to buildings (m)	Risk Score	Planned Replacement Date
N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A

5. RISK ASSESSMENTS

5.1 Model Risk Assessments.

The Model Risk Assessment (RA) shown in the table below, highlight the factors that will affect the safe management of the flow of gas, and the provision of the emergency response service. These RA, reviewed and modified as appropriate to this establishment, are shown at Annex C. (These RA must be reviewed and authorised by the GRP as being correct for this establishment with the date entered at the top of the RA).

RA No.	Title (Model Risk Assessments)
1	Any gas leak considered hazardous to persons or property (Under med/low pressure conditions).
2	Fire or explosion near to, or directly involving, a pipeline or gas facility.
3	A failure of operation of pipeline/plant onsite, or immediately downstream of site, that is maintained by the gas transporter.
4	A failure of operation of pipeline/plant onsite that is maintained by site services.
5	Failure of safety critical equipment.
6	Under-pressure in the gas system.
7	Over-pressure in the gas system.
8	Failure in system during load shedding.
9	General changes to the gas network.
10	Failure of PPM, general operation of the gas network plant/equipment and safety inspections.
11	Emergency Shutdowns.
12	Interface with Gas Transporter.
13	Interface with the consumers.
14	Interface with Emergency Services.
15	Natural Disasters, civil disturbances, other unforeseen events.

5.2 Additional Site-Specific Risk Assessments.

In addition to the model RA shown above, the site-specific RAs shown below have been identified. These RA are shown in Annex D (As with the Model RAs above, these must be reviewed and authorised by the GRP as being correct for this establishment with the date entered at the top of the RA).

16	
17	
18	
19	

6. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 6) unless stated below:
JSP375 and the requirements of the GSC are followed for this establishment

7. EMPLOYEE COMPETENCE

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 7) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

8. CONTRACTORS

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 8) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

9. HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMUNICATION – INTERNAL

9.1 Health and Safety Communication This section describes the systems in place to enable effective communications within this establishment. Different forms of communication are used to pass information to people within the MOD/MMOs depending on the type of information and the audience including in the event of an emergency.
9.1.1 Public Address System. The public address arrangements for this establishment are shown below
There is no public address system on site
9.1.2 Internal Electronic Correspondence. Details of any internal email or intranet correspondence are shown below
The site has the facility for email to be used for communication. Email addresses for Key site personalities are listed in section 1 of this document.
9.1.3 Direct Contact. Details of any site-specific arrangements for direct MOD / MMO contact with site personnel and families are shown below
Face to face meetings with key personnel are possible on a regular basis if required.

9.1.4 Emergency Plans. Details of any site-wide emergency plans and arrangements, including MMO documents are shown below
No specific gas emergency plan for the establishment is in place. MOD Exemplar Gas Safety Case to be used as guidance.
9.1.5 On-Site Emergency Services. Details of site-specific arrangements for communication with site emergency services, such as fire, are shown below
There are no on-site emergency services. Site personnel will dial 999 for Police, Fire and Emergency Medical services.

10. HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMUNICATION – EXTERNAL

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 10) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

11. AUDITS

11.1 GSM Audit.

The audit process in place monitors and measures compliance with legislation and company policy and is aimed at ensuring the safe flow of gas within the MOD networks and downstream of the consumers ECV.

The GSM audit role is primarily concerned with assuring that the GRP duties are being effectively undertaken and that the gas risks are being effectively managed on the site. All GSM Audits will be carried out using the standard audit template prepared by the DIO PGE. Every site with gas networks shall be audited as frequently as practicable, ideally annually and in accordance with a programme agreed with the DIO PGE. Every site shall be audited at least once every three years. Each GSM shall implement an audit programme which must be agreed by the DIO PGE. All completed audit reports shall be sent to the DIO PGE for review and filing.

As agreed with the PGE, GSM audits on this establishment will be carried out:	On a maximum three-yearly basis
The last GSM audit was conducted on:	24/01/2025
The last GSM audit was carried out by:	Neville King
The qualitive assessment of the GSM audit concluded this establishment is: (safe to continue / safe to continue subject to caveats / unsafe to continue)	Safe subject to caveats
Audit findings:	See Audit Report
Points addressed following last audit:	N/A

12. CO-OPERATION

12.1 Emergency Exercises.

On MOD networks, the MMO utilises EGDN to provide a gas emergency response service for dealing with reported gas escapes. However, the EGDN response would normally be to isolate MOD supplies at the incoming meter installation(s). As this is likely to cause considerable inconvenience and expense to MOD facilities, where possible MMO staff / contractors would attempt to attend the emergency in advance of the EGDN personnel to assess the emergency and advise EGDN accordingly.

It is the responsibility of the HoE to ensure that a gas emergency exercise is conducted on the establishment at least once in a three-year period. The HoE will require the support and involvement of the MMO and all key stakeholders such as the EGDN. Lessons learnt should be actioned and kept within the gas document centre.

Date of last emergency exercise:	No previous emergency exercises
Date of next planned emergency exercise:	Requirement for emergency exercises has been issued to the RFCA for distribution to HoE's, not currently planned in for completion.
Date of last actual emergency involving EGDN:	No previous actual emergency reporting
Were the EGDN involved in the last emergency exercise:	No previous actual emergency reporting
Were the MOD emergency services involved in the last emergency exercise or actual emergency:	No previous actual emergency reporting
Summary of lessons learnt from the last emergency exercise or actual emergency:	No previous actual emergency reporting
Date MMO emergency contact numbers and procedures were last tested:	No previous actual emergency reporting

13. EMERGENCY SERVICE RESPONSE TO GAS ESCAPES

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 13) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

14. INVESTIGATIONS

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 14) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

15. GAS QUALITY

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 15) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

16. CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 16) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

17. ADEQUATE NETWORK PRESSURE

17.1 Network Analysis.

Network Analysis is the primary tool by which the MOD satisfies itself that anticipated levels of demand can be supplied from its MP and LP networks to gas consumers. It allows different scenarios to be examined. The technique ensures the efficient management and operation of the MP and LP gas supply systems. It enables a detailed understanding of the gas supply system to be developed upon which cost effective planning and operating decisions can be made.

In accordance with industry recommendations Network Analyses must be repeated at every site containing an MOD Network at least five-yearly, or sooner, if for gas system modification purposes or when demand profiles have changed, or are expected to change.

For this establishment the network analysis was undertaken by:	DNV
For this establishment the network analysis was undertaken on:	22/02/22

17.2 Design Minimum Pressure.

The MOD utilises nominal minimum design pressures, in compliance with IGE/GL/1. These minimum pressures will be seen at the extremities of the systems under extreme conditions. To ensure that all gas equipment downstream of the meter can be safely operated, it is a gas industry recommendation that the network should maintain a minimum of 20.75 mbar at the end of any service pipe. However, for existing networks, it is permitted to have a pressure as low as 19 mbar at the end of any service under 1 in 20 peak six-minute conditions. This value must also include any temporary contingencies to support maintenance activities. Where any appliances have elevated minimum recommended operating pressures (P_{ign}), the DmP must allow for this, taking into account any pressure losses across the meter (4mbar) and through installation pipework (10% of P_{ign}).

The minimum modelled pressure (based on 1:20 peak 6 minutes flow conditions) at the outlet of the consumers ECV at the system extremity is:	21.3mbar
The location of the minimum pressure is:	Plant room
The declared minimum pressure (DmP) is:	19.0mbar

17.3 Network Analysis Results.

A brief description of the network analysis results is below;

The pipe model was built from the 'WX65-B-A1' file produced by DNV from DNV site surveys, supplied site drawings and utility line drawings where available. The files included the pipe lengths, connectivity, diameters, and materials all used in the modelling.

The demand levels used in the analysis are the maximum estimated flows that the network is likely to experience. This criterion is stated in IGE/GL/1 Planning of Gas Distribution Systems of MOP not Exceeding 16 bar, section 4.2.1:
'Any system should be designed to meet the maximum demands placed upon it.
Note: Experience has shown that this is likely to be the maximum demand that will occur in any period of not less than 6 minutes, expressed as an hourly rate.'
The Poole ARC ACF Network 01 supplies the Plant Room and Kitchen/Laundry. The principal uses for gas are for space/water heating, and catering. The effects of diversity have not been considered. This undiversified demand modelling ensures that the worst-case scenario is assessed.

Details of installed appliances were available for all buildings on site. The appliance input ratings (kW) were used to calculate the peak instantaneous flow rates (sm3/h). These values represent the maximum flow within the pipe network and are undiversified values.

Gas is supplied to Poole ARC ACF from a low pressure (LP) main. Supply pressure data obtained by DNV in the form of instantaneous pressure readings shows the outlet pressure of the main site regulators to be as follows:

Network 01 Bulk Fiscal Primary Meter (BFPM), located in the Gas Meter House had an outlet pressure of 21.5 mbarg (standing). This instantaneous pressure recorded at this meter has been used as the model operating pressure.

Regulator and BFPM Capacity

Details of the supply regulator and BFPM for the network are as shown below:

Supply Regulator Make and Model	*BFPM Make and Model*	*Supply Meter Capacity (sm^3/h)*	*Estimated Maximum Flow (sm^3/h)*
Elster	*G25*	*40*	*22.62*

In accordance with the recommendations of Section 8.3.2 of IGE/GL/1, a pressure survey would normally be carried out on the Poole ARC ACF network to verify that the results from the network model were indicative of the recorded pressures on the network. This is a practice which is widely used throughout the gas industry to provide confidence in network analysis models.

The network was surveyed on the 22nd February 2022. Single point pressure readings using a Druck pressure gauge or similar were recorded. These are attached to the outlet of the supply regulators and at the appliances in the buildings where possible.
A simple pressure survey of short-term single readings was undertaken at the BFPM. It was not possible to take pressure readings elsewhere in the network. The recorded pressures taken in this type of survey may be standing pressures where the appliances are not operational, or working pressures, where they are. There may be several mbar differences between these pressures.

17.4 Network Validation Survey.

As part of the network analysis validation procedure, pressure monitoring points are to be installed on MOD networks to enable pressure surveys to be conducted. In accordance with the recommendations of Section 8.3.2. of IGE/GL/1, pressure surveys will need to be carried out on MOD networks to verify that the results from the network models were indicative of the recorded pressures on the network. This is a practice which is widely used throughout the gas industry to check network models provide realistic results.

It is the responsibility of the MMO to ensure adequate pressure surveys are conducted at regular intervals to validate the pressures predicted by network analysis results. This must be conducted at a minimum of once every five years, in conjunction with a Network Analysis or when demand profiles on the network have changed. Similarly, if the results of a previous Network Analysis are suspected to be inaccurate (for example, low extremity pressures being experienced), a repeat Network Analysis should be undertaken.

For this establishment the latest validation survey was undertaken by:	DNV
For this establishment the latest validation survey was undertaken on:	22/02/2022

17.5 Network Validation Survey Results.

A brief description of the network validation survey results is below which includes a comparison of the modelled pressure and actual pressure record;

No test points installed in the main building plant room.

It was therefore not possible to validate the findings of the network analysis modelling. Defects have been raised (10/02/2023) for the appropriate test points to facilitate future operation and maintenance testing requirements. The defects are open and follow on works will be undertaken to update and revalidate the network analysis once funded.

Test points installed in 2024 at new external GRP which supplies the main building plant room.

17.6 Corrective measures.

Following the network analysis and network validation survey the below corrective or mitigation measures have been planned at this establishment;

MOD network name / ID:	1

Modelling of the documented infrastructure and maximum estimated gas demands shows that all the buildings modelled should receive gas with a pressure above the minimum limit of 19 mbarg within the network.
The results for the Poole ARC ACF model are satisfactory.

18. GAS SUPPLY EMERGENCIES

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 18) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

19. GAS QUALITY – SOLE CONVEYER

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 19) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

20. DISCONTINUING GAS SUPPLY

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 20) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

21. RESTORATION OF SUPPLIES

No site-specific considerations (refer to MOD Gas Safety Case Section 21) unless stated below:
No site-specific considerations confirmed.

ANNEX A - ABBREVIATIONS

4C's	Co-ordination, Co-operation, Communication and Control
AE	Authorising Engineer
CI	Cast Iron
CIPS	Close Interval Potential Survey
CP	Cathodic Protection
DI	Ductile Iron
DIO SD EUS	Defence Infrastructure Organisation Service Delivery, Energy, Utility and Sustainability
DIO TS	Defence Infrastructure Organisation Technical Services
DIO	Defence Infrastructure Organisation
DmP	Design Minimum Pressure
ECV	Emergency Control Valve
EGDN	External Gas Distribution Network
FIM	Functional Independence Measure
GRP	Gas Responsible Person
GSIUR	Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations1998
GSMR	Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996
GSC	Gas Safety Case
GSM	Gas Safety Manager
GSMP	Gas Safety Management Plan
HoE	Head of Establishment
HP	High Pressure
IGEM	Institute of Gas Engineers and Managers
IP	Intermediate Pressure
LP	Low Pressure
LPG	Liquified Petroleum Gas
MAM	Meter Asset Manager
MMO	Maintenance Management Organisation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MP	Medium Pressure
NA	Network Analysis
NG	Natural Gas
NVS	Network Validation Survey
PE	Polyethylene
PGE	Principal Gas Engineer
PRI	Pressure Reduction Installation
PUS	Permanent Under Secretary
RA	Risk Assessment
SHEF	Safety, Health, Environment and Fire
TLB	Top Level Budget Holder

ANNEX B - SITE LAYOUT DRAWINGS.



Drawing to be updated due to network alterations.



Drawing to be updated due to installation alterations


DO NOT SCALE, IF IN DOUBT ASK. ALL DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETRES UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED.
CARETAKERS HOUSE
15 CU
22 CU
22 CU
22 CU
C
B
M
MAM/MOD
ECDM/MAM
METER BOX
LEGEND
NETWORK PIPEWORK
METER INSTALLATION
INSTALLATION PIPEWORK
HIDDEN PIPE
OPEN VALVE
CLOSED VALVE
SOLENOID VALVE
RELIEF VALVE
SLAM SHUT VALVE
REGULATOR
DROP WEIGHT VALVE
REGULATOR & SHUT OFF VALVE
BOILER
CATERING
HEATER
HOT WATER
GAS FIRE
METER
CHECK METER
FILTER
WALL
END CAP
PRESSURE / PURGE POINT
CHANGE IN DIAMETER
OWNERSHIP DEMARCATION
SIV SERVICE ISOLATION VALVE
ECV EMERGENCY CONTROL VALVE
AECV ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY CONTROL VALVE
MOV METER OUTLET VALVE
PE POLYETHYLENE
ST STEEL
CU COPPER
SS STAINLESS STEEL
PF PRESS FIT
NOTES:
1. The information shown on this plan is given without warranty, the accuracy thereof cannot be guaranteed. No liability of any kind whatsoever is accepted by DNV or their agents for any error or omission.
Drawing List
WX65-A-A3 - Poole ARC - P&ID Layout
WX65-B-A1 - Pool ARC - Site Layout
Rev Date Drn by Chk by Apr by Description
Site: POOLE ARC
Title: LINE DIAGRAM
Client: RFCA
Drg No: WX65-A-A3
DNV
Holywell Park,
Ashby Road,
Loughborough, LE11 3GR
Drawn By P.Baird 20/12/23 Sheet 2 of 2
CAD Check By A.Hodge 09/01/24 Sheet Size A3
ENG Check By D.Cooper 15/01/24 Scale NTS
Approved By N.Ring 17/1/2024 Rev -

ANNEX C

ANNEX C - MODEL RISK ASSESSMENTS

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 01	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Any gas leak considered hazardous to persons or property	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Any leak at any pressure can be quantified as a hazard. The higher the pressure and/or depending on the location of the leak the risk to the surrounding area varies
	Depending on the severity of the leak, other hazards such as explosions, fires, supply failures, pollution and associated financial implications could arise
	Depending on how quickly & thoroughly the gas leak is dealt with the resulting hazards from the incident will vary.
Caused By	Damage to pipelines from digging
	Failure of control equipment
	Damage caused by general construction
	Corrosion of pipelines
	Failure of mechanical joints and seals
	Deterioration or rupture of pipeline
	Poor communication between involved parties can exacerbate the problem
	Length of response time by first responders
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Damage to pipelines caused by uncontrolled escaping gas
	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Damage to persons & property
	Risk of Explosions & Fire
	Pollution of environment
	Purging maybe required after corrective action
Current Preventative Methods	Permits to Dig
	Planned Preventative Maintenance
	Type & Quality control of materials used in gas network
	Strict adherence to emergency procedures in the event of an emergency
	Installation of gas network to industry standards
	Gas Safety Management Plan (GSMP) Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	Training of all involved parties – not carried out or managed
	Training and simulated gas emergency drills – not carried out or managed
	Emergency signage not to standard – not carried out or managed
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 02	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Fire or explosion near to, or directly involving, a pipeline or gas facility	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Any fire or explosion directly involving a gas pipeline or facility could cause a major incident.
	Any fire or explosion near to a gas pipeline or facility may cause personal injury and or damage to property.
Caused By	Undetected trapped gas
	Unresolved gas leaks
	Failure of control equipment, pipelines, seals, joints etc.
	Damage to gas pipelines through digging and/or general construction
	Incorrect initial procedure when dealing with a gas leak
	Inadequate action by first responder
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Fire and/or explosions causing death and/or injury to general populous
	Damage and/or destruction of surrounding properties
	Damage to gas pipelines, gas control centres & other gas related equipment
	Disruption of gas supply
	Secondary Explosions & Fire resulting from inaction
Current Preventative Methods	Scheduled Maintenance
	Designed for purpose
	Permits to Dig
	Strict adherence to emergency procedures, including ventilating and evacuating area
	Gas Safety GSMP Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	Training and simulated gas emergency drills – not carried out or managed
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 03		
For: Poole ARC ACF		**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
A failure of operation of pipeline/plant onsite, or immediately downstream of site, that is maintained by the EGDN		**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Any incident directly involving the medium pressure pipelines onsite can only be dealt with by SGN in the event of a leak the response time by SGN has an impact on the severity of the incident	
	The level of cooperation and communication between EGDN and the onsite parties has an impact on the eventual severity of the incident	
Caused By	Poor response time by SGN	
	Poor communication between onsite parties and SGN	
	Poor coordination of onsite parties and SGN	
	Poor communication of procedures	
	Lack of supply resulting in drop in supply pressure, resulting in site wide gas supply failure	
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Disruption of gas supply to whole site	
	Re-commissioning & purging after corrective action	
	Re-ignition of non-automatic ignition systems	
	Long down time due to above hazards	
Current Preventative Methods	General communication between site and Southern Gas Networks	
	Use of GSMP	
Further Required Preventative Methods	Communication of site procedures to SGN – not carried out or managed	
	Understanding SGN procedures – not carried out or managed	
	Training and simulated gas emergency drills – not carried out or managed	
	Training for quicker response time- not implemented RFCA to liaise with SGN	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.	

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 04	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
A failure of operation of pipeline/plant onsite that is maintained by site services	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Any incident directly involving the low or medium pressure pipelines onsite can be dealt with by the onsite gas operatives. In the event of a leak the response time by the onsite operatives has an impact on the severity of the incident
	The level of cooperation and communication between onsite parties such as emergency services and gas operatives has an impact on the eventual severity of the incident
Caused By	Poor response time by site services
	Poor communication between onsite parties
	Poor coordination of onsite parties
	Poor communication of procedures
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Disruption of gas supply to whole site
	Re-commissioning & purging after corrective action
	Re-ignition of non-automatic ignition systems
	Long down time due to above hazards
Current Preventative Methods	Scheduled Maintenance
	Designed for purpose
	Permits to Dig
	Strict adherence to emergency procedures
	Gas Safety Management Plan Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	Training and simulated gas emergency drills – not carried out or managed
	Training for quicker response time – not carried out or managed
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 05	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Failure of safety critical equipment	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Failure of safety critical equipment can have a severe impact on the safety of the gas network.
Caused By	Lack of/or poor maintenance
	Incorrect use of equipment
	Ageing equipment
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Lack of control over gas network, resulting in a gas incident
	Lack of control over gas network during a gas incident
Current Preventative Methods	Scheduled Maintenance
	Designed for purpose
	Regular operational training
Further Required Preventative Methods	Replacing old equipment where required – funding to be raised by WXRFCA to replace plant room boilers and controls.
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 06	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Under-pressure in the gas system	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	If at any point the pressure in a gas network drops below a certain level, gas safety regulators will stop the flow of gas.
	If the pressure in a gas network, leading into a house or facility, drops below a certain level a gas safety regulator will terminate the flow of gas. On this site, there are 4 appliances in one building.
Caused By	Gas leaks
	Poor gas network management
	Failure of Compressors
	Inadequate supply of gas in the system
	Failure of pressure control system
Hazards Resulting from Risk	
	Loss of gas supply
	Long recovery period
	Potential for air in the gas network
Current Preventative Methods	
	Scheduled Maintenance
	Designed for purpose
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 07	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Over-pressure in the gas system	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	If at any point the pressure in a gas network climbs above a certain level, gas safety regulators will stop the flow of gas. These regulators are fitted to gas appliances and in some instances will also be downstream of the gas meter into individual houses. There is also a regulator on the main intake to the site
	If the pressure in a gas network, leading into a house or facility, climbs above a certain level a gas safety regulator will terminate the flow of gas.
Caused By	Failure of pressure control system
	Incorrect pipe/valve sizing
	Blockages in system
	Poor gas network management
Hazards Resulting from Risk	
	Rupture of gas pipes due to high pressure related
	Damage to valves and other control equipment
	Damage to seals and joints
	Loss of gas supply
Current Preventative Methods	
	Scheduled Maintenance
	Designed for purpose
	Pressure monitoring
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 08	
For: **ARC Peronne Road**	**Accepted by:** **Ian Jackson**
Failure in system during load shedding	**Date reviewed:** **21/02/2025**
Risk	In the event of a gas supply emergency, load shedding can be used to stabilise the pressure in the system. However, if a section is isolated and the consumers on that branch use their gas supply the pressure in that branch will drop below acceptable levels and the pressure safety regulators will trip
Caused By	Insufficient communication between onsite parties and the end user
	Insufficient means of monitoring pressure
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Loss of gas supply
	Gas safety regulators being tripped (requires manually resetting on older models)
	Long recovery period
	Potential for air in the gas network
Current Preventative Methods	Refer to the Gas Safety Management Plan Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 09	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
General changes to the gas network	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	If during the design phase the sizing of the system is under/oversized, it could result in under/over pressure scenarios.
	If during the installation of a gas network, the work is not carried out to the relevant British Standards and if the work is not undertaken by operatives trained and skilled to the same British Standards, failure may take place.
Caused By	Incorrect pipe sizing at design phase
	Underestimating impact on overall site gas supply
	Incorrect installation of plant and pipelines
	Under qualified gas operatives used for gas works
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Damage to pipelines and gas network plant and equipment
	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Damage to persons & property
	Risk of Explosions & Fire
Current Preventative Methods	Using trained individuals to carry out work to the gas network
	Checking credentials of design authority for gas network redesign
	Monitoring competence of gas network operatives
	Use of the Gas Safety Management Plan
	Checking commissioning of completed works
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 10	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Failure through PPM, general operation of the gas network plant/equipment and safety inspections	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Inadequate action during maintenance can cause failure in the system
	If safety inspections are not carried out regularly, the system may be vulnerable to failure
	The day-to-day operation of the system is vital to the overall performance of the gas network. If the day-to-day operation is not undertaken to industry standards, the gas network could be vulnerable to failure
Caused By	Gas plant & pipelines are not sufficiently maintained
	Scheduled activities do not take place.
	Operatives are insufficiently trained
	Inadequate co-ordination of operation
	Inadequate communication between onsite parties
	Inadequate planning of scheduled activities
	Inadequate inspection and testing of equipment
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Damage to pipelines and gas network plant and equipment
	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Damage to persons & property
	Risk of Explosions & Fire
Current Preventative Methods	Monitored and maintained
	Using trained individuals to carry out work to the gas network
	Using qualified operatives
	Monitoring competence of gas network operatives
Further Required Preventative Methods	Following PPM schedules to carry out works – not carried out or managed.
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 11	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Emergency Shutdowns	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	Emergency shutdowns can be used in the event of a gas incident which warrants the gas network or part thereof to be shut down. If this process fails, it can have a severe impact on the resolution of the incident
Caused By	Failure of emergency shutdown valves
	Ageing emergency shutdown valves
	Lack of sufficient facilities for segregated shutdowns
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Escalating hazard cause by existing emergency
	Damage to pipelines and gas network plant and equipment
	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Long down time
Current Preventative Methods	Site to immediately contact RFCA Emergency Service Provider on 0800 317 960
	Contact site Gas Responsible Person or Gas Safety Manager
	Refer to the Gas Safety Management Plan Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	Following PPM schedules to carry out works – not carried out or managed
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 12		
For: Poole ARC ACF		**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Interface with Gas Transporter		**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	If interfaces between the site team and the gas transporter are not managed carefully, the fallout from gas incidents can become more pronounced	
Caused By	Poor response time by EGDN	
	Poor communication between onsite parties and EGDN	
	Poor coordination of onsite parties and EGDN	
	Poor communication of procedures	
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Damage to pipelines	
	Resultant hazards from any gas incident can escalate	
	Risk of causing a supply emergency	
	Damage to persons & property	
	Risk of Explosions & Fire	
Current Preventative Methods	Communication with EGDN	
Further Required Preventative Methods		
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.	

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 13		
For: Poole ARC ACF		**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Interface with Consumer		**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	If communication between the site team and the end user are not carefully established, the fallout from gas shortages could result in the system having to be purged and the pilot lights re-ignited. On a site such as this, it could take up to 1 day to re-ignite all pilot lights.	
Caused By	Poor communication	
	Lack of understanding	
	No method of checking on gas usage	
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Risk of causing a supply emergency	
	Loss of pressure in system	
	Long recovery period	
	Potential for air in the gas network	
Current Preventative Methods	Contact sites Gas Responsible Person or Gas Safety Manager	
	Refer to the site Gas Safety Management Plan Part A and B	
	Communication with all departments on the site	
Further Required Preventative Methods		
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.	

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 14	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Interface with Emergency Services	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	The first responder has a duty to minimise the risk to the surrounding area upon arrival. If the gas incident is within an enclosed area, isolating the system is the correct course of action. However, in an open, well-ventilated area, isolating the system may not be necessary, and could cause secondary hazards
Caused By	Poor communication
	Lack of understanding
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Causing the need to purge systems
	Long downtime of gas network
Current Preventative Methods	Use of the Gas Safety Management Plan
	Monitored and maintained
Further Required Preventative Methods	Providing training to the Emergency Services, so that they will be able to better tackle gas incidents – not carried out or managed
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Site Reviewed Model Risk Assessment - 15	
For: Poole ARC ACF	**Accepted by: Ian Jackson**
Natural Disasters, civil disturbances, other unforeseeable events	**Date reviewed: 21/02/2025**
Risk	The risk of unforeseeable events causing gas related incidents cannot be planned for. However, it is possible to minimise the impact of the resulting hazards
Caused By	Explosions
	Ground tremors
	Gas pipe sabotage
Hazards Resulting from Risk	Damage to pipelines caused by uncontrolled escaping gas
	Risk of causing a supply emergency
	Damage to persons & property
	Risk of Explosions & Fire
	Pollution of environment
	Purging maybe required after corrective action
Current Preventative Methods	High security levels
	Immediately contact RFCA emergency gas contact number 0800 317 960 in the event of a gas escape or damaged pipe
	Contact site Gas Responsible Person or Gas safety Manager
	Refer to the Gas Safety Management Plan Part A and B
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.

ANNEX D

ANNEX D - ADDITIONAL SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE
Please copy and add further sheets as required

Additional Site-specific Risk Assessment 16	
For:	**Approved by:**
	Date reviewed:
Risk	
Caused By	
Hazards Resulting from Risk	
Current Preventative Methods	
Further Required Preventative Methods	
Audits	In the event of an incident, near miss or any other hazardous occurrence this RA must be reviewed and updated as appropriate.